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Trade Union Growth in Canada: 
1911-1970 
R. Swidinsky 
This paper is primarily an atîempt to isolate the déter-
minants of trade union membership growth in Canada over 
the past six décades. 
Economists hâve generally been puzzled by the irregular pattern of 
union growth in both Canada and the U.S. during the 1900's. Léo Wol-
man1 has argued that favourable économie conditions very likely provide 
the most fertile periods for the expansion of unionism. Not only are 
workers more aware of the économie and noneconomic gains that union-
ization may render, but employers are least résistant to the unionizing 
activities of their employées during phases of business expansion. Bern-
stein2 dismisses the business cycle theory of union growth, emphasizing 
instead secular forces and spécifie periods of social unrest and économie 
disturbances. Labour force growth, coupled with the spread of union 
security arrangements, the acceptance of the union as a permanent insti-
tution and the increase homogeneity of the labour force are sufficient 
to account for the upward trend in union membership. Short-run depar-
tures from trend are presumably with économie fluctuations. The two 
théories differ primarily in that Bernstein emphasizes secular forces 
whereas Wolman gives more weight to cyclical influences. 
Efforts to identify empirically the déterminants of union growth 
hâve met with mixed success. Hines 3 has argued that trade union growth 
in the U.K. is related positively 
with price changes and the level of 
profits and negatively with the per-
centage of the labor force organized. 
SWIDINSKY, R., Professor, Depart-
ment of Economies, Collège of So-
cial Sciences, University of Guelph, 
Guelph, Ont.. 
1 Léo WOLMAN, The Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism, (New York, The 
National Bureau of Economie Research, 1936). 
2 I. BERNSTEIN, «The Growth of American Trade Unions», American 
Economie Review, XLIV (June, 1954). 
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A careful examination of his estimated équations shows, however, that the 
hypothesis holds only for the overal period, 1893-1961 (excluding the war 
years). The price change variable is insignificant in the estimated équa-
tions for ail three subperiods analyzed and the profits variable has a néga-
tive sign in two of thèse équations. 
The more récent attempt by Ashenfelter and Pencavel4 to quan-
tify the explanatory variables stressed by Wolman, Bernstein and others 
appears to hâve captured the essence of the historical growth of U.S. 
trade union membership from 1900 to 1960. In gênerai, the findings 
that union membership responds positively to inflationary pressures and 
negatively to the proportion of the labour force organized is consistent 
with those for the U.K. However, unlike the U.K., the magnitude of 
worker grievances, changes in employment and changes in political at-
titudes towards the union movement also appear to hâve contributed 
significantly to union membership growth in the U.S. 
Despite thèse efforts there remain a large number of unanswered 
questions about the causes and implications of union growth. Most perti-
nent among thèse questions are : (i) Do économie or sociological and 
political factors best explain past patterns of union growth ? (ii) Can 
thèse factors be relied upon to predict future patterns of growth in union 
membership ? and (iii) What is the optimal size of the union sector ? 
While the first two issues hâve been debated at length, the question of 
optimal union growth has been almost entirely ignored. 5 
This paper is primarily an attempt to isolate the déterminants of 
trade union membership growth in Canada over the past six décades. As 
Figure 1 shows, the rate of change in union membership fluctuated widely 
from décade to décade, with the most significant phases of expansion 
occurring during 1915-19, 1936-37, 1941-44 and 1946-47. 6 The Cana-
3 A. G. HINES, « Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom, 
1893-1961 », Review of Economie Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (October, 1964). 
4 Orley ASHENFELTER and John H. PENCAVEL, « American Trade 
Union Growth: 1900-1960, > Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 83, No. 3 
(October, 1969). 
5 JOHNSON and MIESZKOWSKI recognize this question in a somewhat 
indirect manner. See Harry G. JOHNSON and Peter MIESZKOWSKI, « The 
Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium 
Approach», Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. LXXIV, No. 4 (November, 
1970), pp. 560-561. 
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dian pattern of union growth coincided roughly with that of U.S. union 
membership, but there are significant différences in timing and in ma-
gnitudes of expansion and contraction. Obviously, the variables specified 
by Ashenfelter and Pencavel would not necessarily provide the best fit 
for the Canadian data, and clearly, the political variable they include is 
somewhat irrelevant in the Canadian case. 
FIGURE 1 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP IN CANADA AND THE U.S., 
1912-1970 
•î'0 1920 Me if+e Use llic I<Î7Û 
Section I of this paper develops a testable model of union mem-
bership growth. The second section contains an empirical test of the 
model as well as an analysis of the results. The final section diverges 
slightly from the main stream of analysis in that it contains a brief dis-
cussion of the optimal growth of the union sector. The two discussions 
are obviously not unrelated. If the union sector has reached an optimal 
size it is unlikely that union membership will again expérience phases of 
rapid growth. 
6
 The average annual rate of membership growth by décade is 15.5% 
for 1911-1919 -1.4% for 1920-1929, 1.5% for 1930-1939, 11.2% for 1940-1949, 
3.8% for 1950-1959 and 4.1% for 1960-1969. 
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A MODEL OF UNION GROWTH 
To maintain consistency with previous studies we define trade union 
growth as the rate of change in union membership, (AM). Changes in 
union membership can resuit from changes in the size of existing local 
unions or from changes in the number of local unions. Thus 
AM = AMi + AM2 (1) 
where AMi is the percentage change in aggregate union membership 
resulting from a contraction or expansion of membership in existing 
locals and AM2 is the percentage change in aggregate membership arising 
from changes in the number of locals. 7 AMi can be expressed as the 
function 
AMi = AM0 + aiAE + a2AS (2) 
where AM0 refers to autonomous membershep changes, AE to the rate 
of change in employment in unionized firrns and AS to changes in union 
recruiting attitudes. Unless union security is universal workers in union-
ized firrns will hâve the option of joining or withdrawing from their 
union.8 Thèse movements are assumed autonomous, depending primarily 
on the individual worker's préférences for the private and collective 
services offered by the trade union. A worker, having joined the union, 
may realize that he values the union's collective services substantially 
above its private services and withdraw his membership. Similarly, another 
worker who had previously decided against joining the union may reassess 
the value of the private services he could enjoy only through membership 
and décide to join the union. 9 
7 Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
dM dMx dM2 
•AM = = + 
M M M 
where dMx is the absolute change in membership of existing local unions and 
dM2 is the absolute change in membership resulting from newly certified or 
decertified locals. The decertification of locals can be treated alternatively as a 
décline of the membership of existing locals. There remains the conceptual 
problem of how to treat the amalgamation or splitting-up of locals. It is pro-
bably more appropriate to view such locals as continuing organizations. However, 
the problem does not arise in the empirical estimations. 
8
 Union security refers to the présence of union shop, closed shop or other 
methods of compulsory membership. 
9 The distinction between private, semicollective and collective services is 
made in John H. PENCAVEL, «The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise», 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 2. (January, 1971), p. 182. 
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Employment changes are expected to exert a positive influence on 
A Mi, but the magnitude of this influence dépends on the distribution of 
employment changes among firms with différent degrees of unionization 
and the prevalence of union security arrangements. Thus if ail union firms 
were completely organized and operated under union security arrange-
ments, ai would be equal to unity. Given the more realistic conditions 
of less than complète unionization among union firms and nonuniversality 
of union security arrangements, ai is expected to be positive but less than 
unity. 10 AS is included because the aggressiveness with which unions 
recruit new membership may be subject to considérable variations. Hines 
has argued that whenever unions become militant in their wage demands 
they increase their bargaining power by recruiting additional member-
ship. n Thus AMi may be quite sensitive to the pattern of wage nego-
tiations. 
AM2 is expected to vary positively with the rate of change in the 
number of local organizations (AL). Thus 
AM2 = bAL (3) 
where b is the elasticity of membership with respect to the number of 
local unions. Organizational efficiency dictâtes that unions organize larger 
firms in the earlier stages of union growth and subsequently bring into 
the unionized sector smaller units. This implies that b is likely to décline 
with an increase in the percentage of the labour force unionized (T). 
Assuming that b is a lienar function of T, 
b = b0 + bj: (4) 
AM2 can be written as the function 
AM2 - b0AL + bi (AL-T) (5) 
where b0> 0 and bi < 0. 
AL can be viewed as a function of several économie forces. Speci-
fically, AL is expected to vary negatively with the rate of unemployment 
10 Although the extent of union security arrangements in Canada is not 
known, it is probably less widespread than is generally believed. In Britain 
in 1964 only two out of five unionists worked in closed shop conditions. See 
PENCAVEL, «The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise», p. 182. 
11
 This hypothesis originates with HINES, « Trade Unions and Wage 
Inflation in the United Kingdom, 1893-1961 ». 
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(U) and positively with the rate of price inflation (AP) and the rate of 
change in U.S. union membership (AMUS). AL can be written as the 
linear function. 
AL = c0 + ciU + c2AP + c3AMus (6) 
Whether workers in nonunion firms become organized dépends on 
their subjective évaluation of the respective costs and benefits of union 
membership. 12 Presumably union membership is not costless to a worker. 
It reduces his range of options in his relations with the employer. A 
highly skilled and efficient worker may hâve considérable power in bar-
gaining over wages, promotion and working conditions in a nonunion 
firm which he cannot exercise in a collective context. Union membership 
also imposes a monetary cost in terms of initiation fées and dues, and it 
leaves open the possibility of économie losses during strike situations. 
There may also exist a noneconomic cost in terms of compliance with 
union rules and régulations and the time that must be allocated to union 
affairs. The most obvious benefits accrue in the form of improved 
wages, fringe benefits, working conditions, seniority rights and grievance 
settlements. In addition, unionization may give rise to noneconomic bene-
fits, such as the feeling of enhanced security and worker solidarity. 
In a period of growing unemployment, the costs of union member-
ship loom large relative to the benefits. When économie activity déclines, 
a worker's primary concern is employment security and unions are gen-
erally impotent in providing such protection. Moreover, employées who 
are active in organizing a firm, or who are sympathetic to the union 
cause, can be discharged for allegedly économie reasons. In periods of 
rising employment, a worker's attention is again focused on wages, 
working conditions and other factors that a union can be expected to 
influence. Thus the relative benefits of union membership are likely to 
be assessed more favourably during the expansionary phase of the busi-
ness cycle. Since the subjective assessment of cost and benefits differ 
widely among individuals, not ail workers would assess unionism as 
yeilding a net benefit even under improved économie conditions. It is 
likely, however, that when unemployment is low an incrcased number of 
workers might feel that union membership yields a positive net benefit. 
In some firms this feeling may prevail among the majority so that the 
certification of new locals becomes more likely. 
12 See ASHENFELTER and PENCAVEL, «American Trade Union Growth: 
1900-1960», p. 436. 
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The behaviour of existing unions tends to accentuate the cyclical 
pattern of union formation. Unions are unlikely to undertake costly 
organizing campaigns in the face of declining revenues caused by unem-
ployment among their membership, nor are they likely to do so when 
the probability of success is low. With more bouyant économie condi-
tions thèse impediments are not only weakened but unions may try to 
strengthen their positions in the impending contract negotiations by con-
trolling a larger fraction of the industry's labour supply. 
The AP variable is included to test the argument set forth by 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel that unions are partly défensive organizations 
in that workers accept unionization in inflationary periods as a rneans of 
protecting their real wage. The close relation between U.S. and Canadian 
trade unions through the international union suggests that the rate of 
growth of unions in the U.S. may also be an important explanatory 
variable. Conceivably, a major organizing thrust in the U.S. may spill 
over into Canada, partly as a conséquence of the international corporate 
structure. There is also the possibility that Canadian workers may react 
strongly to events and trends in the U.S., especially to changes in labour 
législation. 
Substituting Equation (6) into (5) we dérive Equation (7) . 
AM 2 = b0c0 + boClU + b0c2AP + b 0 c 3 AM u s 
+ b l C oT + b1c1 (U-T) + b l C 2 (AP-T) 
+ b l C 3 (T-AMUS) 
(7) 
And replacing AMT and AM2 in Equation (1) by Equations (2) and 
(7) we dérive Equation (8) . 
AM = ( A M 0 + b0 c0) + a i A E + a, AS + b ^ U 
+ b A A P + b 0 c 3 AM u s + b lCoT + b l C l (U-T) 
+ b l C 2 (AP-T) + b l C 3 (T-AMUS^ 
(8) 
The coefficients a^ a2» b0c9 and b0c3 are expected to be positive 
and the coefficients b0c1 and b ^ négative. The signs of the cross-product 
coefficients, cannot be readily determined a priori. Unfortunately, many 
of the structural parameters that are of particular interest cannot be de-
duced from the estimated coefficients. 
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II. A TEST OF THE MODEL 
Since the T variable is dominated by a strong positive trend, the 
cross-product terms in Equation (8) are highly correlated with each 
other and with T. Accordingly, to eliminate multicollinearity with the 
estimating équation is respecified as 
AMt = k0 + kjAE, + k2ASt + k3Ut +k4AP t_! 
, + k5Tt_, + k . A M ^ 
(9) 
where k0 = AM0 + b0c0, etc., and the cross-product terms omitted. AH 
variables are entered concurrently with the exception of AP and T. The 
one period lag in AP is consistent with the notion that there is a delay 
in the worker's reaction to price changes, although a one year lag may 
be excessive. Ail variables, with the exception of AS, can be observed 
directly. It can be argued, however, that increased union militancy cul-
minâtes in a higher level of strike activity, and if unions recruit more 
aggressively when they become militant there ought to exist a positive 
corrélation between industrial unrest and union membership growth. Thus 
the rate of change in strikes is used as a proxy for changes in union 
recruiting activity. 
Equation (9) is the basic relationship on which the empirical analy-
sis of this section is based. Ail OLS régression estimâtes are derived from 
annual aggregate data for the periods 1911-1970, 1911-1939 and 1946-
1970. Presumably, the factors related to union growth prior to 1939, 
when unions were struggling for récognition, are quite différent from 
those in the latter period when unions become well entrenched, and the 
régression estimâtes for the two periods ought to yield some évidence of 
thèse developments. The régression results are given in Table I. 
The estimated coeficients for 1911-1970 are consistent with theo-
retical expectations and their magnitudes are quite plausible, although 
the AE t and APt_x coefficients are not significantly différent from zéro 
at the 5 percent level of significance. The performance the Ut coef-
ficient tends to support Wolman's business cycle theory of union growth. 
The estimated coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase 
in the unemployment rate would reduce the rate of growth of union 
membership by as much as .81 percentage points. Labour strife and 
union growth are highly correlated in this period, thus seemingly lending 
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TABLE I 
RÉGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND t-VALUES 
ESTIMATED FROM EQUATION ( 9 ) * 
Independent 
Variable 1911-1970 
Period 
1911-1939 1946-1970 
Constant 11.16 
• ^ (3.83) 
26.23 
(3.01) 
26.42 
(5.56) 
A E t • : . , ,-! 0.22 
(1.58) 
0.18 
(0.67) 
0.37 
(2.28) 
AP,., \r" 0.28 
(1.38) 
0.60 
(1.67) 
-0.24 
(1.66) 
AS, - j ^ ' 0.12 
(4.28) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
T v ^ ' 
A M U S t ' " • * 
-0.81 
(3.43) 
0.16 
(0.30) 
-1.05 
(3.12) 
-0.18 
(2.06) 
0.28 
(3.11) 
-1.91 
(2.45) 
0.26 
(1.96) 
-0.67 
(4.07) 
0.55 
(1.51) 
R2 0.72 0.78 0.89 
DW 1.56 1.73 1.34 
support to Hines' thesis that union membership growth is a precondi-
tion of union wage demands. Alternatively, the positive relation between 
AMt and ASt may reflect little more than the fact that the process of 
union formation and récognition prior to amendements in Canadian in-
dustrial relations législation during the late 1930's and early 1940's was 
typified by industrial conflict.13 In the absence of machinery that would 
compel employers to recognize and bargain with unions, workers had 
little option other than to force the issue through a strike process. 
* For a définition of the variables employed and the sources of data see 
Appendix A. 
13 See H. D. WOODS, Labour Policy in Canada, 2nd éd., (Toronto, MacMil-
lan of Canada, 1973), ch. 3. 
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The alternative hypothèses may be subjected to a rough test by 
changing the lag spécification on AS. Thus if union growth pr&ceeds 
union militancy, the corrélation between ASt and AM t - 1 ought to be 
most significant, but if the alternative hypothesis is superior the régres-
sion of AM t on ASt or ASt_j ought to provide a better fit. It is 
obvious from the following simple régressions for the period 1911-1970 
that the spécification that yields the best fit is the one in which union 
militancy coincides or précèdes union growth. There thus appears to be 
less support for Hines' hypothesis than for the alternative explanation of 
the relation between AM and AS. However, while this empirical évidence 
sheds some light on the circumstances and processes of union growth, it 
faite to explain why workers would sélect one period rather than another 
in which to force the issue of union récognition. 
1. AMt = 3.38 + 0.17 St R2 = 0.23 
(2.68) (3.93) 
2. AMt = 4.03 + 0.16 St_t R2 = 0.23 
(2.84) (3.90) 
3. ASt = 8.82 + 0.06 Mt_t R2 = 0.01 
(1.78) (0.14) 
Not surprising, Canadian trade union growth is strongly correlated 
with the growth of U.S. trade unions. This relation probably manifests 
itself not only through the international union structure but also through 
similarities in économie events and labour législation. The significantly 
négative Tt_t coefficient supports the hypothesis that as union member-
ship increases the recruitment of additional membership becomes more 
difficult. This finding is consistent with the notion of organizational 
efficiency, but, alternatively, it may reflect nothing more than a diminu-
tion of recruiting efforts by established unions as they attain the optimal 
size in tenus of security and économie objectives. 
By contrast, the estimated équation for 1911-39 is rather poor in 
that only the T t - 1 and AMu s t coefficient are significant. Given the 
volatility of union membership changes in this period the poor results 
are not surprising, although the low significance levels for the AS t and Ut 
coefficients are somewhat disappointing. The estimated équation for 
1946-1970 is much improved and the results are generally consistent with 
the expected changes over time. The increased use of union security 
clauses and the maturing of union would dictate a significant corrélation 
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AMt and AE t. The AEt coefficient indicates that some 37 percent of 
employment changes in the unionized sector are translated into propor-
tionate changes in union membership in that period, but it is very likely 
that there is also a lagged response in the sensé that new employées join 
unions in subséquent periods. The unemployment rate continues to exert 
a depressing effect on union growth as does the percentage of the labour 
force organized. The increase in T since 1946 imphes a décélération in 
the growth of union membership by some 3.8 percentage points by 1970. 
The coefficients of the remaining variables are not significant at 
the 5 percent level and the price variable is, moreover, unexpectedly néga-
tive. In comparison with the 1911-1970 estimâtes, worker militancy 
is no longer a contributing factor in union growth, probably because 
industrial relations législation has made such organizing tactics redun-
dant. It is also interesting to note that whatever relationship existed 
between U.S. and Canadian membership growth seems to hâve disap-
peared, but the reasons are not readily apparent. 
The consistent insignificance, and even unexpected sign, of the 
AP t coefficient is a strong contradiction of the thesis that unions are 
partly défensive organizations. This finding is not altered if différent lag 
spécifications on AP are introduced of changes in real wages are used 
instead of price changes. But the finding that nonunion workers do not 
accept unionization more readily during inflationary periods is not sur-
prising in view of G. Lewis' findings that union-nonunion wage dif-
ferentials tend to narrow under such économie conditions.14 Thus, if 
nonunion workers are unwilling to organize when the net benefits of 
unionization are increasing, that is, when union-nonunion wage differ-
entials are widening, there is even less reason for them to initiate col-
lective action when the net benefits of such action are decreasing. 
In summary, union membership growth over the period 1911-1970 
appears closely associated with économie fluctuations, union militancy 
and the growth of trade unionism in the U.S. Since 1946 the expansion 
of membership is related primarily with employment growth in the 
unionized sector, the rate of unemployment and the prevailing degree 
of unionization. Since employment increases in the unionized sector are 
quite moderate it is obvious that the growth of union membership will 
14 H. C. LEWIS, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States: An 
Empirical Inquiry, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963), ch. VI. 
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be relatively limited unless unions break new ground. Whether it is in 
the interest of existing membership to do so is subjected to analysis in 
the following section. 
THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF UNION GROWTH 
It can be demonstrated that the interests of unionized workers in 
any given industry lie in an extension of their influence until they hâve 
effective control over the industry supply of labour. The percentage of 
the industry labour force that must be organized for effective control 
will vary among industries, but it is unlikely to require total unionization 
in any industry. It has not been demonstrated, however, that it is in the 
gênerai interest of workers in the union sector to promote union growth 
in unrelated industries in the non-union sector. That is, should the 
Canadian Labour Congress allocate funds to promote, for example, the 
unionization of white-collared workers or should it attempt to confine 
the union sector to its présent dimensions. 
Discounting worker solidarity and other noneconomic considéra-
tions as motives for spreading unionism, it can be shown that the exten-
tion of union jurisdiction into the nonunion sector is not neeessarily 
bénéficiai, and indeed can be economically injurious, to workers in the 
union sector. Johnson and Mieszkowski15 hâve shown that, in gênerai, 
if the union sector is capital intensive union wage gains will be primarily 
at the expense of workers in the nonunion sector. Conversely, if the 
union sector is labour intensive the cost of union wage gains will likely 
fall on capital. In the former case unionism results in a redistribution 
of income between union and nonunion labour and in the latter a redis-
tribution between labour and capital. The net benefits of an expanded 
union sector can be viewed in this context. 
Suppose the union sector is capital intensive and that ail unions are 
equally effective in raising wages above the equilibrium wage level. For 
any given wage increase in the union sector, ail other things being equal, 
the corresponding wage decrease in the nonunion sector must be greater 
the larger the union sector relative to the nonunion sector.16 For example, 
if the union sector is Vz of the labour force and the elasticity of labour 
demand is unity in both sectors, a 15 percent wage increase in the union 
15 JOHNSON and MIESZKOWSKI, «The Effects of Unionization in the 
Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach>. 
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sector is consistent with a 7.5 percent réduction in nonunion wages. If 
the union sector expands to 2A of the labour force nonunion wages would 
hâve to be depressed by 30 percent to accommodate a 15 percent union 
wage increase. On the other hand, if wages in the nonunion sector cannot 
be reduced below a level specified by a socially acceptable wage or an 
effective minimum wage, the wage increase the union sector can effect 
without producing unemployment will be smaller the larger the union 
sector relative to the nonunion sector. The magnitudes of allowable wage 
changes will dépend crucially on the elasticities of labour demand in the 
two sectors. In the limit, if the union sector absorbs completely the non-
union sector union wage gains can be made only by a redistribution from 
capital to labour, and changes in factor shares dépend on an entirely 
différent set of forces. 
It is quite plausible that workers in newly formed unions are not 
as effective in making wage gains as those previously organized. An 
extension of unionism into the nonunion sector would thus leave relative 
wages basically unchanged. Workers in stronger unions would make 
wage gains at the expense of workers in weaker unions, but there could 
be a redistribution of income among workers depending on the distribu-
tion of power among the différent unions. 
Finally, if workers in the union sector gain by a redistribution from 
capital to labour, an extension of unionism into the nonunion sector 
ought not to hâve an adverse wage effect on workers in the union sector. 
Indeed, union wage gains may be enhanced by the extension of union 
control if labour's ability to capture a larger share of output is in some 
way dépendent on political processes. 
Since the union sector comprises the relatively capital intensive 
industries of mining, forestry, manufacturing, construction and trans-
portation, communications and utilities, union growth probably has the 
effect of minimizing the net benefits of unionization in thèse industries. 
If this analysis is valid, it is surprising that union leadership would 
seek to promote unionism among white collar workers and workers in 
trade, finance and service industries. Conceivably, efforts to promote 
unionism are more apparent than real ; the philosophy of worker soli-
16 See Albert REES, « The Effects of Unions on Resource Allocation », The 
Journal of Law and Economies, Vol. 6 (October, 1963). 
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darity demands that union policy at least give the appearance of favouring 
union growth. 
On the other hand, if unions pursue actively the organization of 
the non-union sector, the traditional model of the trade union as an 
économie institution whose sole function is the maximization of its mem-
bers' wealth becomes somewhat déficient. A more realistic model of the 
trade union in that case is one that incorporâtes the political as well as 
économie character of the institution. À union is distinct from its mem-
bers in terms of its needs and objectives. It is interested not solely in 
wealth, but also in its own survival and power. Thèse considérations 
demand that the union attempt to influence public policy to ensure a 
favourable climate for union activity. Whether it is successful in this 
pursuit will dépend in no small measure on the dynamic nature of the 
institution. 
If union workers' wage gains are largely the resuit of a redistribution 
of functional shares, the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power are 
consistent with each other. Similarly, if unions in the formerly nonunion 
sector are ineffective in altering their relative wage position the exten-
sion of union control over the supply of labour is not in conflict with 
the wealth objectives of workers in the formerly unionized sector. By 
contrast, if unionized workers gain at the expense of nonunion workers 
the pursuit of power is likely to be incompatible with the pursuit of 
wealth. Where the union tends to be more of an économie institution, 
as in Canada and the U.S., the union sector is likely to remain relatively 
small. By contrast, where économie considérations are subservient to 
political considérations, as in European unions, union growth will com-
mand a greater emphasis in union policy. 
The course of future growth will likewise be determined by the 
reaction of unorganized labour. If the bargaining power of ail unions in 
ail industries is equal workers in the nonunion sector should organize 
in order to maintain their relative wage position. If bargaining power 
varies among unions, those workers who cannot improve their relative 
wage position by organizing are better off to remain in the nonunion 
sector. By rejecting union status thèse workers not only avoid the costs 
involved, they also minimize the political influence that unions can exert. 
It is quite plausible that in moderating union political influence nonunion 
workers may enhance their own relative économie position. 
TRADE UNION GROWTH IN CANADA : 1911-1970 449 
APPENDIX A 
The spécification of the variables used in the régressions reported in Table I 
and the sources of data are follows. Ail data are annual. 
AM t = t (M t + 1 - M ) /2M]. 100 where M is aggregate union membership in 
year t. The source of data is Canada Department of Labour, Labour 
Organizations in Canada, (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971), p. 
XViii, Table 1. 
[(E ~ )/2E )]. 100 where E is employment in the manufacturing, 
logging, mining, communications, transportation and construction indus-
tries in year t. Employment by industry is constructed from annual em-
ployment indices and the numbers employed in Census years. Sources 
of data are D.B.S., Canada Year Book (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, Annual), 
various issues and Census of Canada, various issues. 
AP t = t (P t + 1 - P t_1)/2P t]. 100 where P"t is the price index, 1949 = 100. Source 
of data are Historical Statistics of Canada, éd. M.C. Urquart and 
K. A. H. Buckley, (Toronto, MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 304, Séries 
J139-152 and Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, Ottawa, monthly. 
ASt = t (S t + 1 - S t l ) / 2 S t ] . 100 where St is the number of strikes. Source of 
data is Canada Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada 
(Ottawa, Queen's Printer, Annual). 
U t is the unemployment rate. Data for 1911-1914 is the U.S. unemployment 
rate published in U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960, Séries D47. 
Data for 1915-1920 is the unemployment rate among union members 
published in Canada Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, Ottawa, 
monthly, various issues and also in D.B.S., Canada Year Book, Annual, 
various issues. The 1921-1960 unemployment rates refer to the aggregate 
unemployment rates as published in Historical Statistics of Canada, p. 61, 
Séries C47-55. The 1961-70 unemployment rates are found in D.B.S., 
Seasonally Adjusted Labour Force Statistics, Ottawa, Annual. 
T is union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural paid workers. 
Source of data is Canada Department of Labour, Labour Organizations 
in Canada, Ottawa, 1971, Table I. Total non-agricultural paid workers 
for 1911-1921 are derived by means of a linear interpolation using the 
1911 and 1921 Census of Canada data. 
AMU S t = [ M u s t + 1 - MU S t_ 1) /2MU S t] . 100 where MU S t is union membership 
in the U.S. in time t. Source of data for 1911-1960 is Irving Bernstein, 
«The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960», Labour History, Vol. 2, 
no. 2 (Spring, 1961), p. 135. The 1961-1968 U.S. union membership 
data is published in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, Annual, Washington, D.C., various issues. The 
1969-1970 union membership is determined by extrapolating the trend 
in the 1960's. 
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Le syndicalisme au Canada de 1911 à 1970 
Le taux de croissance du syndicalisme au Canada depuis le commencement du 
XXe siècle fut plutôt fluctuant. À des périodes d'expansion rapide, telles que celles 
de 1915 à 1916, de 1936 à 1937, de 1941 à 1944 et de 1946 à 1947 ont succédé 
des périodes de contraction marquée dans le nombre total des membres. Les deux 
dernières décennies ont été caractérisées par un taux de croissance relativement 
stable, quoique modéré. Le rythme de développement des syndicats au Canada n'est 
pas tellement différent de celui des États-Unis, mais on observe des variations signi-
ficatives tant dans l'époque que dans l'ampleur des périodes d'expansion et des pério-
des de contraction. 
Les plus importantes théories relatives au développement du syndicalisme sont 
celles qui furent mises de l'avant par Wolman et Bernstein. Les essais en vue de 
quantifier les déterminants de la croissance du syndicalisme mis au point par Hines 
au Royaume-Uni, ainsi que par Ashenfelter et Pencavel aux États-Unis nont obtenu 
qu'un succès relatif. Cet article a d'abord pour objet d'essayer d'individualiser les 
déterminants du taux de croissance du syndicalisme au Canada de 1911 à 1970 en 
retenant l'idée que les changements dans le nombre des effectifs syndicaux peuvent 
coïncider avec les modifications qui se produisent dans le degré de syndicalisation 
ou dans le nombre des unités syndicales. La variation des effectifs à l'intérieur des 
sections locales est déterminée par les fluctuations de l'emploi (AE) et par les 
variations du degré de dynamisme des dirigeants syndicaux dans le recrutement des 
membres (AS). L'accréditation de nouveaux groupes et, par conséquent, les chan-
gements dans les effectifs, dépendent du taux de chômage (U), du taux de l'inflation 
(AP), de la proportion de la main-d'œuvre syndiquée (T) et des effets d'entraîne-
ment de la croissance des syndicats aux États-Unis (AM ). On peut normalement 
s'attendre à ce que le mouvement syndical croisse en fonction de (AE, de AS, de 
AP et de AMTT_ et qu'il décroisse en fonction de U et de T. 
Cet étalon fut vérifié au moyen d'analyses de régression à partir des statistiques 
annuelles au Canada pour les périodes 1911-70, 1911-39 et 1946-70. Étant donné 
qu'il n'était pas possible de quantifier le dynamisme de recrutement syndical (AS), on 
s'est servi à la place comme variable des fluctuations des statistiques en matière de 
grèves. Tous les coefficients obtenus confirment l'hypothèse dans l'analyse de ré-
gression pour la période 1911-1970 à l'exception des changements dans les 
taux d'emploi (AE) et des variations dans le taux de l'inflation qui ne sont 
pas significatifs. Pour la période 1911-1939, l'étalon laisse à désirer. Bien que 
tous les coefficients soient conformes à ce que l'on s'attendait, seuls le pourcentage 
de la main-d'œuvre syndiquée (T) et l'effet d'entraînement du développement du 
syndicalisme aux États-Unis (AMTTC) sont significatifs. En ce qui a trait à l'équa-
Us 
tion relative à la période 1946-1970, seuls les coefficients de la fluctuation de 
l'emploi (AE), du taux dé chômage (U) et du pourcentage de la main-d'œuvre 
syndiquée (T) sont significatifs, ce qui veut dire que, une fois le syndicalisme im-
planté, son développement repose principalement sur les conditions économiques 
et l'expansion de l'emploi. Le degré relatif de syndicalisation dans un secteur semble 
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exercer un effet modérateur sur le taux de croissance du syndicalisme. Bien qu'on 
ait soulevé l'hypothèse que la formation des syndicats soit dans une certaine mesure 
un moyen de protection contre la baisse du revenu réel, il n'y a guère d'indication 
concrète de cette tendance. Non seulement le coefficient du taux d'inflation (AP) 
est-il toujours sans signification, mais il est même négatif dans l'équation se rappor-
tant à la période 1946-1970. L'impression générale qui se dégage de l'analyse, c'est 
que les déterminants du développement du syndicalisme dépendent d'un ensemble 
enchevêtré de facteurs juridique, politique, sociologique et économique. 
La dernière partie de l'article traite du degré optimal de la syndicalisation. Si 
la syndicalisation réussit à accroître les salaires réels des travailleurs syndiqués, elle 
concourt d'une certaine façon à réduire les salaires réels de ceux qui ne le sont pas 
ou de réduire la part de la production revenant au facteur capital. Si la première 
proposition est vraie, l'expansion du syndicalisme peut mener à une certaine déva-
lorisation des avantages véritables. Ainsi, les travailleurs syndiqués peuvent-ils se 
sentir incités à freiner le mouvement de syndicalisation ou, du moins, à ne pas en 
favoriser la croissance. Si les syndicats, au contraire, font des gains aux dépens du 
capital, une plus grande expansion du syndicalisme peut favoriser jusqu'à un certain 
point le transfert du revenu national du facteur capital au facteur travail. 
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